| 1 | import * as lcc from "@distilled.cloud/cloudflare/leaked-credential-checks"; |
| 2 | import * as Effect from "effect/Effect"; |
| 3 | import * as Predicate from "effect/Predicate"; |
| 4 | import * as Stream from "effect/Stream"; |
| 5 | |
| 6 | import { Unowned } from "../../AdoptPolicy.ts"; |
| 7 | import * as Provider from "../../Provider.ts"; |
| 8 | import { Resource } from "../../Resource.ts"; |
| 9 | import { CloudflareEnvironment } from "../CloudflareEnvironment.ts"; |
| 10 | import type { Providers } from "../Providers.ts"; |
| 11 | import { listAllZones } from "../Zone/lookup.ts"; |
| 12 | |
| 13 | const TypeId = "Cloudflare.LeakedCredentialCheck.Detection" as const; |
| 14 | type TypeId = typeof TypeId; |
| 15 | |
| 16 | export interface LeakedCredentialDetectionProps { |
| 17 | /** |
| 18 | * Zone the custom detection belongs to. Stable — moving a detection |
| 19 | * between zones triggers a replacement. |
| 20 | */ |
| 21 | zoneId: string; |
| 22 | /** |
| 23 | * Ruleset expression locating the username in the request, e.g. |
| 24 | * `lookup_json_string(http.request.body.raw, "user")`. Mutable — |
| 25 | * updated in place via PUT. At least one of `username`/`password` |
| 26 | * should be set. |
| 27 | */ |
| 28 | username?: string; |
| 29 | /** |
| 30 | * Ruleset expression locating the password in the request, e.g. |
| 31 | * `lookup_json_string(http.request.body.raw, "secret")`. This is an |
| 32 | * expression over the request (not a secret value). Mutable — updated |
| 33 | * in place via PUT. |
| 34 | */ |
| 35 | password?: string; |
| 36 | } |
| 37 | |
| 38 | export interface LeakedCredentialDetectionAttributes { |
| 39 | /** Cloudflare-assigned identifier of the custom detection. */ |
| 40 | detectionId: string; |
| 41 | /** Zone the detection belongs to. */ |
| 42 | zoneId: string; |
| 43 | /** The username-locating ruleset expression, if set. */ |
| 44 | username: string | undefined; |
| 45 | /** The password-locating ruleset expression, if set. */ |
| 46 | password: string | undefined; |
| 47 | } |
| 48 | |
| 49 | export type LeakedCredentialDetection = Resource< |
| 50 | TypeId, |
| 51 | LeakedCredentialDetectionProps, |
| 52 | LeakedCredentialDetectionAttributes, |
| 53 | never, |
| 54 | Providers |
| 55 | >; |
| 56 | |
| 57 | /** |
| 58 | * A custom detection location for Cloudflare Leaked Credential Checks |
| 59 | * (`/zones/{zone_id}/leaked-credential-checks/detections`) — a pair of |
| 60 | * ruleset expressions telling the WAF where to find the username and |
| 61 | * password in your application's login requests, so credentials submitted |
| 62 | * in non-standard payloads can still be checked against breach data. |
| 63 | * |
| 64 | * Requires Leaked Credential Checks to be **enabled** on the zone (see |
| 65 | * {@link LeakedCredentialCheck}) — every detection operation fails with the |
| 66 | * typed `LeakedCredentialChecksDisabled` error otherwise. The number of |
| 67 | * custom detections is plan-gated (the free plan allows none — creation |
| 68 | * fails with the typed `DetectionQuotaExceeded` error). |
| 69 | * |
| 70 | * Safety: detections carry no ownership markers. When there is no prior |
| 71 | * state, `read` scans the zone for an existing detection with the same |
| 72 | * expressions and reports it as `Unowned`, so the engine refuses to take |
| 73 | * it over unless `--adopt` (or `adopt(true)`) is set. |
| 74 | * ### Custom detection locations |
| 75 | * **Example:** Detect credentials in a JSON login body |
| 76 | * ```typescript |
| 77 | * const check = yield* Cloudflare.LeakedCredentialCheck.LeakedCredentialCheck("Lcc", { |
| 78 | * zoneId: zone.zoneId, |
| 79 | * }); |
| 80 | * |
| 81 | * yield* Cloudflare.LeakedCredentialCheck.LeakedCredentialDetection("LoginBody", { |
| 82 | * // Reference the check's zoneId so the toggle deploys first. |
| 83 | * zoneId: check.zoneId, |
| 84 | * username: 'lookup_json_string(http.request.body.raw, "user")', |
| 85 | * password: 'lookup_json_string(http.request.body.raw, "secret")', |
| 86 | * }); |
| 87 | * ``` |
| 88 | * |
| 89 | * **Example:** Username-only detection |
| 90 | * ```typescript |
| 91 | * yield* Cloudflare.LeakedCredentialCheck.LeakedCredentialDetection("UsernameHeader", { |
| 92 | * zoneId: check.zoneId, |
| 93 | * username: 'http.request.headers["x-username"][0]', |
| 94 | * }); |
| 95 | * ``` |
| 96 | * |
| 97 | * @see https://developers.cloudflare.com/waf/detections/leaked-credentials/#custom-detection-locations |
| 98 | * |
| 99 | * @resource |
| 100 | * @product Leaked Credential Checks |
| 101 | * @category Application Security |
| 102 | */ |
| 103 | export const LeakedCredentialDetection = |
| 104 | Resource<LeakedCredentialDetection>(TypeId); |
| 105 | |
| 106 | /** |
| 107 | * Returns true if the given value is a LeakedCredentialDetection resource. |
| 108 | */ |
| 109 | export const isLeakedCredentialDetection = ( |
| 110 | value: unknown, |
| 111 | ): value is LeakedCredentialDetection => |
| 112 | Predicate.hasProperty(value, "Type") && value.Type === TypeId; |
| 113 | |
| 114 | export const LeakedCredentialDetectionProvider = () => |
| 115 | Provider.succeed(LeakedCredentialDetection, { |
| 116 | stables: ["detectionId", "zoneId"], |
| 117 | |
| 118 | list: Effect.fn(function* () { |
| 119 | const { accountId } = yield* yield* CloudflareEnvironment; |
| 120 | // Detections live inside a zone (`/zones/{id}/.../detections`) with |
| 121 | // no account-wide enumeration API — fan out across every zone and |
| 122 | // exhaustively paginate the per-zone list. |
| 123 | const zones = yield* listAllZones(accountId); |
| 124 | const rows = yield* Effect.forEach( |
| 125 | zones, |
| 126 | (zone) => |
| 127 | lcc.listDetections.pages({ zoneId: zone.id }).pipe( |
| 128 | Stream.runCollect, |
| 129 | Effect.map((chunk) => |
| 130 | Array.from(chunk).flatMap((page) => |
| 131 | (page.result ?? []).map( |
| 132 | (d): LeakedCredentialDetectionAttributes => |
| 133 | toAttributes(zone.id, d), |
| 134 | ), |
| 135 | ), |
| 136 | ), |
| 137 | // Zones without the LCC toggle on refuse all detection reads; |
| 138 | // a freshly-minted scoped token can also 403 mid edge- |
| 139 | // propagation. Either way the zone contributes nothing. |
| 140 | Effect.catchTag( |
| 141 | "LeakedCredentialChecksDisabled", |
| 142 | (): Effect.Effect<LeakedCredentialDetectionAttributes[]> => |
| 143 | Effect.succeed([]), |
| 144 | ), |
| 145 | Effect.catchTag( |
| 146 | "Forbidden", |
| 147 | (): Effect.Effect<LeakedCredentialDetectionAttributes[]> => |
| 148 | Effect.succeed([]), |
| 149 | ), |
| 150 | ), |
| 151 | { concurrency: 10 }, |
| 152 | ); |
| 153 | return rows.flat(); |
| 154 | }), |
| 155 | |
| 156 | diff: Effect.fn(function* ({ olds = {}, news, output }) { |
| 157 | const o = olds as LeakedCredentialDetectionProps; |
| 158 | const n = news as LeakedCredentialDetectionProps; |
| 159 | // zoneId is Input<string>; compare only once both sides are concrete. |
| 160 | const oldZoneId = |
| 161 | output?.zoneId ?? (typeof o.zoneId === "string" ? o.zoneId : undefined); |
| 162 | if ( |
| 163 | oldZoneId !== undefined && |
| 164 | typeof n.zoneId === "string" && |
| 165 | oldZoneId !== n.zoneId |
| 166 | ) { |
| 167 | return { action: "replace" } as const; |
| 168 | } |
| 169 | return undefined; |
| 170 | }), |
| 171 | |
| 172 | read: Effect.fn(function* ({ output, olds }) { |
| 173 | const zoneId = output?.zoneId ?? (olds?.zoneId as string | undefined); |
| 174 | if (!zoneId) return undefined; |
| 175 | |
| 176 | // Owned path: refresh by our persisted detection id. |
| 177 | if (output?.detectionId) { |
| 178 | const observed = yield* getDetection(zoneId, output.detectionId); |
| 179 | if (observed) return toAttributes(zoneId, observed); |
| 180 | } |
| 181 | |
| 182 | // Adoption path: a detection with these expressions may already |
| 183 | // exist on the zone. Detections carry no ownership markers, so we |
| 184 | // cannot prove we created it — brand it `Unowned` so the engine |
| 185 | // refuses to take over unless `adopt` is set. |
| 186 | const username = output?.username ?? olds?.username; |
| 187 | const password = output?.password ?? olds?.password; |
| 188 | if (username !== undefined || password !== undefined) { |
| 189 | const observed = yield* findByExpressions(zoneId, username, password); |
| 190 | if (observed) return Unowned(toAttributes(zoneId, observed)); |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | return undefined; |
| 193 | }), |
| 194 | |
| 195 | reconcile: Effect.fn(function* ({ news, output }) { |
| 196 | // Inputs have been resolved to concrete strings by Plan. |
| 197 | const zoneId = news.zoneId as string; |
| 198 | |
| 199 | // 1. Observe — the detection id cached on `output` is a hint, not |
| 200 | // a guarantee: a missing detection falls through to the |
| 201 | // expression scan and then to create. |
| 202 | let observed = output?.detectionId |
| 203 | ? yield* getDetection(zoneId, output.detectionId) |
| 204 | : undefined; |
| 205 | |
| 206 | // 2. Fall back to scanning the zone for an expression match. |
| 207 | // Ownership has already been verified upstream — `read` reports |
| 208 | // existing detections as `Unowned` and the engine gates takeover |
| 209 | // behind the adopt policy before reconcile ever runs. |
| 210 | if (!observed) { |
| 211 | observed = yield* findByExpressions( |
| 212 | zoneId, |
| 213 | news.username, |
| 214 | news.password, |
| 215 | ); |
| 216 | } |
| 217 | |
| 218 | // 3. Ensure — create when missing. Requires the zone's Leaked |
| 219 | // Credential Checks toggle to be on; otherwise this fails with |
| 220 | // the typed `LeakedCredentialChecksDisabled` error. |
| 221 | if (!observed) { |
| 222 | observed = yield* lcc.createDetection({ |
| 223 | zoneId, |
| 224 | username: news.username, |
| 225 | password: news.password, |
| 226 | }); |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | |
| 229 | // 4. Sync — PUT only when the observed expressions differ. |
| 230 | const dirty = |
| 231 | (observed.username ?? undefined) !== news.username || |
| 232 | (observed.password ?? undefined) !== news.password; |
| 233 | if (dirty) { |
| 234 | observed = yield* lcc.updateDetection({ |
| 235 | zoneId, |
| 236 | detectionId: observed.id ?? "", |
| 237 | username: news.username, |
| 238 | password: news.password, |
| 239 | }); |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | |
| 242 | return toAttributes(zoneId, observed); |
| 243 | }), |
| 244 | |
| 245 | delete: Effect.fn(function* ({ output }) { |
| 246 | yield* lcc |
| 247 | .deleteDetection({ |
| 248 | zoneId: output.zoneId, |
| 249 | detectionId: output.detectionId, |
| 250 | }) |
| 251 | .pipe( |
| 252 | // Already gone — idempotent re-delete after a crashed run. |
| 253 | Effect.catchTag("DetectionNotFound", () => Effect.void), |
| 254 | // The zone's toggle was switched off out-of-band; the API |
| 255 | // refuses all detection operations then. The detection is |
| 256 | // unreachable either way — treat as converged. |
| 257 | Effect.catchTag("LeakedCredentialChecksDisabled", () => Effect.void), |
| 258 | ); |
| 259 | }), |
| 260 | }); |
| 261 | |
| 262 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 263 | // API helpers |
| 264 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 265 | |
| 266 | type ObservedDetection = { |
| 267 | id?: string | null; |
| 268 | username?: string | null; |
| 269 | password?: string | null; |
| 270 | }; |
| 271 | |
| 272 | /** |
| 273 | * Read a detection by id, mapping "gone" (`DetectionNotFound`, Cloudflare |
| 274 | * error code 11002) and "product off" (`LeakedCredentialChecksDisabled`, |
| 275 | * code 11001 — the API refuses all detection reads while the zone toggle is |
| 276 | * off) to `undefined`. |
| 277 | */ |
| 278 | const getDetection = (zoneId: string, detectionId: string) => |
| 279 | lcc.getDetection({ zoneId, detectionId }).pipe( |
| 280 | Effect.map((d): ObservedDetection | undefined => d), |
| 281 | Effect.catchTag("DetectionNotFound", () => Effect.succeed(undefined)), |
| 282 | Effect.catchTag("LeakedCredentialChecksDisabled", () => |
| 283 | Effect.succeed(undefined), |
| 284 | ), |
| 285 | ); |
| 286 | |
| 287 | /** |
| 288 | * Find a detection by exact username+password expression pair within the |
| 289 | * zone. Used for cold reads (state lost) and as the create fallback. |
| 290 | */ |
| 291 | const findByExpressions = ( |
| 292 | zoneId: string, |
| 293 | username: string | undefined, |
| 294 | password: string | undefined, |
| 295 | ) => |
| 296 | lcc.listDetections.items({ zoneId }).pipe( |
| 297 | Stream.runCollect, |
| 298 | Effect.map((chunk) => |
| 299 | Array.from(chunk).find( |
| 300 | (d): d is ObservedDetection => |
| 301 | (d.username ?? undefined) === username && |
| 302 | (d.password ?? undefined) === password, |
| 303 | ), |
| 304 | ), |
| 305 | Effect.catchTag("LeakedCredentialChecksDisabled", () => |
| 306 | Effect.succeed(undefined), |
| 307 | ), |
| 308 | ); |
| 309 | |
| 310 | const toAttributes = ( |
| 311 | zoneId: string, |
| 312 | detection: ObservedDetection, |
| 313 | ): LeakedCredentialDetectionAttributes => ({ |
| 314 | detectionId: detection.id ?? "", |
| 315 | zoneId, |
| 316 | username: detection.username ?? undefined, |
| 317 | password: detection.password ?? undefined, |
| 318 | }); |