| 1 | import type * as cf from "@cloudflare/workers-types"; |
| 2 | import * as Effect from "effect/Effect"; |
| 3 | import * as Layer from "effect/Layer"; |
| 4 | import * as Redacted from "effect/Redacted"; |
| 5 | import { |
| 6 | RepositoryEventSource, |
| 7 | webhookPath, |
| 8 | webhookSecretEnvName, |
| 9 | type RepositoryEventSourceProps, |
| 10 | type RepositoryEventSourceService, |
| 11 | type WebhookEvent, |
| 12 | } from "../../GitHub/RepositoryEventSource.ts"; |
| 13 | import { Webhook } from "../../GitHub/Webhook.ts"; |
| 14 | import * as Namespace from "../../Namespace.ts"; |
| 15 | import * as Output from "../../Output.ts"; |
| 16 | import { isWorkerEvent, Worker } from "./Worker.ts"; |
| 17 | |
| 18 | /** |
| 19 | * GitHub event source for Cloudflare Workers. |
| 20 | * |
| 21 | * Deploy-time: provisions a {@link Webhook} on the repository whose delivery |
| 22 | * URL points at this Worker (at a deterministic per-repo path). The webhook |
| 23 | * secret is bound onto the Worker via an `Output` accessor so the runtime can |
| 24 | * verify delivery signatures. |
| 25 | * |
| 26 | * Runtime: registers a `fetch` listener that claims requests on the |
| 27 | * repository's delivery path, verifies the `HMAC-SHA256` signature against the |
| 28 | * bound secret, and forwards each delivery to the subscriber. Requests on any |
| 29 | * other path fall through to the Worker's own `fetch` handler. |
| 30 | * |
| 31 | * @binding |
| 32 | * @product Workers |
| 33 | * @category Workers & Compute |
| 34 | */ |
| 35 | export const GitHubRepositoryEventSourceLive = Layer.effect( |
| 36 | RepositoryEventSource, |
| 37 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 38 | const ctx = yield* Worker; |
| 39 | // Loosely-typed constructor — yielding the resource class erases its |
| 40 | // `GitHub.Providers` requirement. The requirement is satisfied by the |
| 41 | // stack at plan time. |
| 42 | const createWebhook = yield* Webhook; |
| 43 | |
| 44 | return Effect.fn(function* ( |
| 45 | props: RepositoryEventSourceProps, |
| 46 | process: (event: WebhookEvent) => Effect.Effect<void, never, never>, |
| 47 | ) { |
| 48 | const path = webhookPath(props); |
| 49 | |
| 50 | // Deploy-time: provision the repository webhook pointing at this Worker. |
| 51 | // Skipped once running inside the deployed Worker (the global guard). |
| 52 | // Namespaced under the host so the webhook's logical identity matches the |
| 53 | // previous Binding.Policy. |
| 54 | if (!globalThis.__ALCHEMY_RUNTIME__) { |
| 55 | yield* Namespace.push( |
| 56 | ctx.LogicalId, |
| 57 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 58 | yield* createWebhook(`${props.owner}/${props.repository}`, { |
| 59 | owner: props.owner, |
| 60 | repository: props.repository, |
| 61 | url: Output.interpolate`${ctx.url}${path}`, |
| 62 | events: [...(props.events ?? ["push"])], |
| 63 | secret: props.secret, |
| 64 | contentType: "json", |
| 65 | }); |
| 66 | }), |
| 67 | ); |
| 68 | } |
| 69 | |
| 70 | // Bind the webhook secret as a Worker env accessor under a |
| 71 | // deterministic key. This single `yield*` does both halves: at plan |
| 72 | // time it registers a `secret_text` binding (the engine deploys |
| 73 | // `Redacted` values as Cloudflare secrets), and it returns an Effect |
| 74 | // that reads the value back from `WorkerEnvironment` at runtime — |
| 75 | // reconstructing the `Redacted` wrapper. No direct `event.env` access. |
| 76 | const secret = props.secret |
| 77 | ? yield* Output.named( |
| 78 | Output.asOutput(props.secret), |
| 79 | webhookSecretEnvName(props), |
| 80 | ) |
| 81 | : undefined; |
| 82 | |
| 83 | yield* ctx.listen((event) => { |
| 84 | if (!isWorkerEvent(event) || event.type !== "fetch") return; |
| 85 | const request = event.input as cf.Request; |
| 86 | |
| 87 | let pathname: string; |
| 88 | try { |
| 89 | pathname = new URL(request.url).pathname; |
| 90 | } catch { |
| 91 | return; |
| 92 | } |
| 93 | // Not our delivery path — let the Worker's own handler take it. |
| 94 | if (pathname !== path) return; |
| 95 | |
| 96 | return handleDelivery(request, secret, process); |
| 97 | }); |
| 98 | }) as RepositoryEventSourceService; |
| 99 | }), |
| 100 | ); |
| 101 | |
| 102 | const handleDelivery = <Req>( |
| 103 | request: cf.Request, |
| 104 | // The bound secret accessor (see `Output.named` above). `undefined` when |
| 105 | // no secret was configured, in which case deliveries are accepted |
| 106 | // unverified. |
| 107 | secret: Effect.Effect<Redacted.Redacted<string> | undefined> | undefined, |
| 108 | process: (event: WebhookEvent<any>) => Effect.Effect<void, never, Req>, |
| 109 | ): Effect.Effect<Response, never, Req> => |
| 110 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 111 | if (request.method !== "POST") { |
| 112 | return new Response("method not allowed", { status: 405 }); |
| 113 | } |
| 114 | |
| 115 | const body = yield* Effect.promise(() => |
| 116 | (request as unknown as Request).text(), |
| 117 | ); |
| 118 | |
| 119 | if (secret !== undefined) { |
| 120 | const resolved = yield* secret; |
| 121 | const signature = request.headers.get("x-hub-signature-256") ?? undefined; |
| 122 | const valid = yield* verifySignature( |
| 123 | resolved ? Redacted.value(resolved) : undefined, |
| 124 | body, |
| 125 | signature, |
| 126 | ); |
| 127 | if (!valid) { |
| 128 | return new Response("invalid signature", { status: 401 }); |
| 129 | } |
| 130 | } |
| 131 | |
| 132 | const name = request.headers.get("x-github-event") ?? "unknown"; |
| 133 | const id = request.headers.get("x-github-delivery") ?? ""; |
| 134 | |
| 135 | let payload: unknown; |
| 136 | try { |
| 137 | payload = JSON.parse(body); |
| 138 | } catch { |
| 139 | payload = body; |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | |
| 142 | // The wire shape matches `EmitterWebhookEvent`, but the runtime can't |
| 143 | // statically prove `name`/`payload` line up with a specific member of |
| 144 | // the discriminated union — GitHub's headers are the source of truth, so |
| 145 | // cast across the boundary. |
| 146 | const delivery = { id, name, payload } as unknown as WebhookEvent; |
| 147 | |
| 148 | yield* process(delivery).pipe(Effect.orDie); |
| 149 | |
| 150 | return new Response(null, { status: 202 }); |
| 151 | }); |
| 152 | |
| 153 | const verifySignature = ( |
| 154 | secret: string | undefined, |
| 155 | body: string, |
| 156 | signature: string | undefined, |
| 157 | ): Effect.Effect<boolean> => |
| 158 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 159 | if (!secret || !signature || !signature.startsWith("sha256=")) { |
| 160 | return false; |
| 161 | } |
| 162 | const expected = yield* Effect.promise(async () => { |
| 163 | const encoder = new TextEncoder(); |
| 164 | const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey( |
| 165 | "raw", |
| 166 | encoder.encode(secret), |
| 167 | { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, |
| 168 | false, |
| 169 | ["sign"], |
| 170 | ); |
| 171 | const digest = await crypto.subtle.sign( |
| 172 | "HMAC", |
| 173 | key, |
| 174 | encoder.encode(body), |
| 175 | ); |
| 176 | const hex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(digest)) |
| 177 | .map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")) |
| 178 | .join(""); |
| 179 | return `sha256=${hex}`; |
| 180 | }); |
| 181 | return timingSafeEqual(expected, signature); |
| 182 | }); |
| 183 | |
| 184 | /** |
| 185 | * Constant-time string comparison. Avoids leaking signature bytes through |
| 186 | * early-exit timing differences. `crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual` isn't |
| 187 | * available on Workers without `nodejs_compat`, so we roll a small one. |
| 188 | */ |
| 189 | const timingSafeEqual = (a: string, b: string): boolean => { |
| 190 | if (a.length !== b.length) return false; |
| 191 | let mismatch = 0; |
| 192 | for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) { |
| 193 | mismatch |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i); |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | return mismatch === 0; |
| 196 | }; |